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    Archive for November 25th, 2013




    Recently, independent security researchers found that the Angler Exploit Kit had added Silverlight to their list of targeted software, using CVE-2013-0074. When we analyzed the available exploit, we found that in addition to CVE-2013-0074, a second vulnerability, CVE-2013-3896, in order to bypass ASLR. These vulnerabilities are discussed in two separate Microsoft security bulletins, namely MS13-022 and MS13-087, respectively.

    This particular exploit checks what version of Silverlight is installed on a user’s system and only runs on the following versions:

    • 4.0.50401
    • 4.0.60310
    • 4.1.10329
    • 5.0.61118
    • 5.1.10411

    Up-to-date versions of Silverlight are not affected by this exploit; in this case it simply exits.

    Anti-analysis Capabilities

    The main component of the exploit is a DLL named fotomaster.dll (MD5 hash: 5f36a4c019d559f1be9fdd0cd770be2e), which is a PE file that contains MSIL (Microsoft Intermediate Language) code, as is expected of an app written using Silverlight. We detect this as TROJ_EXPLOIT.SVL. The exploit is loaded via a Silverlight app on a malicious website; when the app is loaded fotomaster.dll is loaded and the MSIL code inside is executed.

    The exploit also uses several techniques to make analysis more difficult. These include:

    Preventing Decompiling

    Normally, the first step in reverse-engineering a .NET binary is to decompile it into its source code, in order to understands its logic and flow. However, this exploit has obfuscated its code. This causes standard decompiling tools to fail, as can be seen here:

    Figure 1. Failed decompilers

    Preventing Disassembly

    If a .NET binary cannot be decompiled, disassembly into MSIL code would be the next step. The .NET SDK provides a tool, ildasm.exe, to do this. However, Microsoft itself has provided a technique that prevent this.

    Figure 2. Failed disassembler

    Obfuscated names and code

    The above technique makes disassembly more difficult, but does not prevent it completely. However, if one looks at the resulting MSIL code, one finds that it is highly obfuscated and not human-readable. For example, all the class names and method names use unreadable characters and junk code is inserted everywhere to hide the actual control flow of the program.

    Exploit Analysis

    Vulnerabilities used

    As mentioned earlier, the exploit uses two separate vulnerabilities in Silverlight. The first one, CVE-2013-3896, is an information leak vulnerability which can be used to leak sensitive information which is in memory. The exploit uses this vulnerability to leak a pointer address in memory, and then uses this leaked address to compute the base address of mscorlib.ni.dll, bypassing ASLR. Later, this base address is used to compute the ROP gadgets in order to bypass DEP.

    The second vulnerability, CVE-2013-0074, is a double-dereference vulnerability, which is used to control the execution flow to jump to the ROP gadget.

    The ROP Gadget

    Instead of using a sequence of ROP gadgets as many other exploits do, this exploit contains only one ROP gadget, as shown below:

    83493440        or      dword ptr [ecx+34h],40h
    b801000000      mov     eax,offset <Unloaded_pi.dll> (00000001)
    ret     4

    The effect of this ROP gadget it to temper the length field of a .NER uint array. After the ROP gadget is executed, the length of the array becomes a very large value (0x40000003). This array can be used to read/write nearly arbitrary memory in the process’s memory space. This technique of overwriting the length of buffers is well-known, as similar techniques have been in used in Adobe Flash, Java, and Internet Explorer.

    The Shellcode

    After the buffer’s length field is modified, the exploit will use this buffer to search the process memory space to find some executable memory (a JIT-compiled function’s code area), then copy the shellcode into the executable memory area and execute it. The shellcode resolves the necessary APIs dynamically, and downloads the payload from the server by invoking APIs in wininet.dll, as shown below:

    Figure 3. Shellcode

    Silverlight and Java

    Java is currently the favored targets of exploit kits today. However, there are many similarities between Java and Silverlight:

    • Both of them are VM languages (Java bytecode versus MSIL code).
    • Both of them can be embedded in a web page and started remotely.
    • Both of them run in a sandbox which is based on dynamical privilege checks in critical library functions. When started from web browser, both of them have low privileges by default.
    • Both require breaking the sandbox to create exploits.

    More exploits against Silverlight in the future cannot be ruled out, but mass attacks are unlikely considering Java’s superior market penetration. However, for targeted attacks, it does offer a tempting target. We will continue to monitor the threat landscape for other Silverlight-related threats.

    Microsoft has released two bulletins for the two vulnerabilities:

     
    Posted in Exploits, Malware, Vulnerabilities | Comments Off



    Cybercriminals can do just as much damage deleting users’ data as stealing it because file deletion can result in both data or monetary loss. One example would be CryptoLocker, which became notorious for combining the two—demanding money with the threat of data destruction. We recently came across a malware, detected as VBS_SOYSOS, that deletes important image files including .DWG files.

    As far as malware techniques go, VBS_SOYSOS is not the first malware to delete files. However, it is rare for VBScript malware to delete files. The deletion of DWG files, which is a known output of computer-aided design (CAD) software, poses risks to certain industries, including the automotive, engineering, manufacturing and architectural design industries, which are known to use these software.

    Based on feedback from the Smart Protection Network, this malware is currently spreading in Mexico. The number spiked on November 10, with a single variant accounting for 3,331 infections. VBS_SOYSOS was found to spread in systems via removable drives.

    Further analysis of the obfuscated code reveals that the malware contains a simple script. Once executed, it creates copies of itself using file names of files with .MP3, .JPG and .DWG extensions found in all removable drives. But rather than hiding the original files, VBS_SOYSOS deletes these.

    131125_fugre1_soysos_code

    Figure 1. Screenshot of VBS_SOYSOS script

    Users can check if if their system is infected with the malware by looking for its copy, which is named D&D.vbe. It also adds a marker 4U Denia & Dania to the registry.

    131125_fugre2_VBS_SOYSOS_A

    Figure 2. VBS_SOYSOS Autostart Registry

    This VBScript malware disables the  Task Manager and the Registry Editor so manual cleanup will require third-party tools with similar functions terminated applications. It is important for users to install security solutions like those from Trend Micro to avoid malware infection. To prevent data loss, users are encouraged to back up their important data by using the 3-2-1 rule.

     
    Posted in Malware | Comments Off


     

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