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    Author Archive - Weichao Sun (Mobile Threats Analyst)




    We have uncovered certain Android apps (detected as ANDROIDOS_BOTPANDA.A) containing a malicious library file, which when executed, renders the infected device as a zombie device that connects to specific command and control (C&C) servers. What is also noteworthy about this file is that it hides its routines in the dynamic library, making it difficult to analyze.

    The malicious library libvadgo contained in ANDROIDOS_BOTPANDA.A was developed via NDK and loaded using Java Native Interface. NDK is a toolset used by would be-Android developers in creating apps. ANDROIDOS_BOTPANDA.A contains the file com.airpuh.ad/UpdateCheck, which loads libvadgo library and calls the Java_com_airpuh_ad_UpdateCheck_dataInit function using the following code:

    Based on our analysis, one of the noteworthy routines of Java_com_airpuh_ad_UpdateCheck_DataInit is it verifies whether an infected device is rooted by checking the file /system/xbin/su. If found, this file executes /system/xbin/su and then the commands below in /system/xbin/su:

    Java_com_airpuh_ad_UpdateCheck_DataInit also executes .e[int_a]d file, which will be removed after several minutes. The first thing that .e[int_a] file does is to check the existence of /system/lib/libd1.so, replace files, and hook some important system commands [rm move mount ifconfig chown ] under system/xbin/ by creating corresponding files under system/bin/ to prevent detection and clean up. All of the created files are duplications of system/lib/lib1.so. It also modifies system/bin/svc by adding a malicious line into it so that the malicious can be launched automatically.

    The .e[int_a]d file also performs the malware’s main routine, which is to communicate with C&C servers ad.{BLOCKED}ew.com ad.{BLOCKED}o8.com and ad.{BLOCKED}8.com through port 8511. These servers, however, were already down during our analysis thus we cannot confirm the exact commands that it performs on the infected device.

    As mentioned previously, what makes this threat noteworthy is ANDROIDOS_BOTPANDA.A’s use of the dynamic library libvadgo.so. This type of malware hides its malicious routines in the said dynamic library, making it hard to analyze. It also kills certain processes, hooks important system commands, and replaces files to make detection and removal solutions difficult. If more Android malware use this technique in the future, delivering analysis and solutions will prove to be challenging for security experts.

    This malware also runs specifically on rooted devices, thus it is likely that this may spread through third-party app stores. ANDROIDOS_BOTPANDA.A is another reason why users are advised to be cautious in downloading apps, specifically those from third-party app stores. To know more about how to better protect yourself from Android-OS specific threats, you may refer to our digital life e-guides below:

    Updates as of June 12, 2012 3:15 AM PST time

    Trend Micro protects users from this threat via Mobile Security Personal Edition, which detects the apps that contain this malicious library file.

    To determine if a device is infected, users should look at the application’s files, in particular this folder path system/lib and check for the file libd1.so. Also users can look at svc file in the folder path /system/bin and check if it contains line /system/bin/ifconfig to determine if device is infected.

     
    Posted in Malware, Mobile | Comments Off



    Recently ZTE acknowledged the existence of a vulnerability in its Android-based smartphone Score M. The said vulnerability, if exploited, can allow attackers to operate with root privileges—a scenario that can mean an attacker will have complete control over the affected phone. We have taken some time to analyze this backdoor in order to help affected users remove it from their Score M handsets.

    This backdoor is an ELF (executable and linkable format) file under /system/bin/ named “sync_agent”. It has a default “setuid” permission which, after it launches, has the ability to set itself as root.

    Upon execution, this backdoor checks the password provided against the password indicated in its code, “ztex1609523” and if verified correct, raises a system call [setuid] with ‘0’ as parameter. Note that since the backdoor has a setuid attribute, even if the user who launched the backdoor does not have root privilege, the system call can still execute successfully. Doing so also sets the backdoor’s EUID (effective UID) to 0, which also means a root privilege.

    The backdoor then launches the program /system/bin/sh to get a root shell.

    We then used strace to trace all the system calls this backdoor’s process made. As seen below, the backdoor was able to set itself as root and execute /system/bin/sh:

    Throughout these calls, the user never sees any prompt that the backdoor has gained root privilege or that any other command is being executed.

    Based on our analysis, it appears this root shell can only be used locally, because this backdoor didn’t open any socket or any other remote communication tunnel.

    However, we believe it can be used by other malicious applications to combine a remote root shell. The only thing the malicious app needs to do is provide a bash script to the backdoor, then the said script will be executed.

    For instance, if we write a shell script as seen below:

    Note that this script does nothing but print a line with several ‘L’s and print its id to announce its root privilege.

    Now we run the backdoor that has been provided our script as a parameter.

    From this screen shot we can see that our script runs successfully.
    We then use strace to print the system call log. See below:

    We can see that the arguments sent to function execve changed to our shell script.

    In conclusion, a malware can easily use this backdoor in combination with a remote backdoor or bot. The preinstalled backdoor need only receive an SMS command or connect to a remote C&C server to receive commands from a remote attacker, and then call the local backdoor with a certain shell script.

    If you own a ZTE Score M you can remove this backdoor by following these instructions:

    1. Run the backdoor on an adb shell: /system/bin/sync_agent ztex1609523
    2. To check which device your /system dir has mounted, use the command: mount. There should be a print out like below, note the device name underlined in red:
    3. Remount the system partition as RW with command: mount –o remount,rw /your/device/name /system.
    4. Remove the backdoor from the system with command: rm /system/bin/sync_agent.
    5. Terminate the backdoor with ctrl+c.

    To keep your mobile device safe from malicious applications, make sure you have a trusty mobile security solution installed like the Mobile Security Personal Edition.

    To know more on how to better protect yourself from threats related to your mobile devices, you may read our comprehensive e-guides below:

    Update as of May 26, 2012 3:31 AM PST Time

    Trend Micro detects this backdoor as ANDROIDOS_GAPUSSIN.CDC.

     
    Posted in Malware, Mobile | Comments Off


     

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