Our network monitoring system recently detected an enormous amount of Mirai-like scanning activity from China. From 1:00 p.m. UTC on March 31 to 12:00 a.m. UTC on April 3, our team detected an influx of activity coming from 3,423 IP addresses of scanners. Brazil appeared to be the target location of the scanning of networked devices, including routers and IP cameras.Read More
In our latest research paper on healthcare cybersecurity, Securing Connected Hospitals, which was produced in partnership with HITRUST, we examined internet-connected medical-related devices and systems such as databases, hospital admin consoles, and medical devices. We also looked into the supply chain, which has been an attack vector that is often overlooked.Read More
Using a machine learning system, we analyzed 3 million software downloads, involving hundreds of thousands of internet-connected machines, and provide insights in this three-part blog series. In the first part of this series, we took a closer look at unpopular software downloads and the risks they pose to organizations. We also briefly mentioned the problem regarding code signing abuse, which we will elaborate on in this post.
Code signing is the practice of cryptographically signing software with the intent of giving the operating system (like Windows) an efficient and precise way to discriminate between a legitimate application (like an installer for Microsoft Office) and malicious software. All modern operating systems and browsers automatically verify signatures by means of the concept of a certificate chain.
Valid certificates are issued or signed by trusted certification authorities (CAs), which are backed up by parent CAs. This mechanism relies entirely and strictly on the concept of trust. We assume that malware operators are, by definition, untrustworthy entities. Supposedly, these untrustworthy entities have no access to valid certificates. However, our analysis shows that is not the case.Read More
We identified a MacOS backdoor (detected by Trend Micro as OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D) that we believe is the latest version of a threat used by OceanLotus (a.k.a. APT 32, OceanLotus, APT-C-00, SeaLotus, and Cobalt Kitty). OceanLotus was responsible for launching targeted attacks against human rights organizations, media organizations, research institutes, and maritime construction firms. The attackers behind OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D target MacOS computers which have the Perl programming language installed.
The MacOS backdoor was found in a malicious Word document presumably distributed via email. The document bears the filename “2018-PHIẾU GHI DANH THAM DỰ TĨNH HỘI HMDC 2018.doc,” which translates to “2018-REGISTRATION FORM OF HMDC ASSEMBLY 2018.doc.” The document claims to be a registration form for an event with HDMC, an organization in Vietnam that advertises national independence and democracy.Read More
On March 25, we saw that the number of cryptocurrency web miners detected by the Trend Micro Smart Protection Network suddenly spiked. Our team tracked the web miner traffic and found that the bulk of it was linked to MSN.com in Japan. Further analysis revealed that malicious actors had modified the script on an AOL advertising platform displayed on the site to launch a web miner program.Read More